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I. INTRODUCTION
It seems clear that problems in the field of public finance contain both political and economic elements. Yet, political scientists do not seem to have devoted a major part of their research efforts to the area, and economists traditionally have overlooked the political aspects of the problems.' This paper proposes a particular "political" theory of the expenditures of local governments with the aid of some of the traditional tools of economic analysis, and examines some data referring to the governments of the counties of Pennsylvania in light of the proposed theory.
It should be admitted at the outset, however, that the model developed herein is overly simple and, perhaps, naive. Yet, the authors believe that it has explanatory power, despite the fact that it requires the usual economic assumption of full knowledge, and that it represents a step in a desirable direction. Although the conceptual possibility of subjecting the model to a "direct test" is clearly evident, available data do not permit such a test and a sympathetic interpretation of the empirical results requires the admission of additional and rather strict assumptions. Hence, the empirical results do not constitute a convincing test of the major implication but merely serve to indicate that this theory, even when augmented with additional assumptions, seems to add explanatory potential to the standard models.
II. THE POLITICAL APPROACH TO PUBLIC FINANCE
This particular "political approach" has its intellectual basis in the works of Downs [7] , Buchanan and Tullock [2] , and Tullock [13] . Accordingly, it uses a particular view of the political process which is certainly not the only possible view, but which simply seems to be useful for the problem at hand. The basic postulate of this view is that in a democratic society individual voters are the underlying determinants of political decisions. Politicians, who actually make both expenditure and taxation decisions, are conceived as being motivated mainly by a desire to attain and remain in power (office). trarily designate certain individuals to be the sole beneficiaries of public expenditures and neither can they discriminatorily decide who is to be taxed and who is not. In the case of local governments, state laws generally designate the allowable areas of expenditure and types of taxes. Granted this framework, politicians can promise (at election time) or choose (if in office) areas and levels of expenditure and types and rates of taxes. Hence, strategies are constrained and winning majorities can be benefited relative to losing minorities only as expenditures and taxes fall unequally upon the members of the population. As a first approximation, attention is centered upon only these variables-the levels of expenditures and the tax rate-and their "impact" upon various groups in the population is considered in attempting to construct a political theory of local finance.
III. THE SIMPLE CASE OF ONE EXPENDITURE AND A PROPERTY TAX

Consider the following definitions:
N: The number of persons registered to vote in a locality. (The term "locality" is used to mean the area under the jurisdiction of a local government.) x:
The expenditure of the local government.
qik : The quantity of the kth private good-that is, a good which is purchased in the private sector of the economy-which the ith individual purchases and consumes during the period under consideration. pk : The price of the kth good. fi : The utility function of the ith individual.
This function is assumed to be both differentiable and strictly concave (downwards). Its arguments are private goods and the expenditure of the local government. I : The income of the ith individual for the period under consideration. Pi : The assessed value of the taxable property owned by the ith individual. r:
The tax rate on the assessed value of property. 2 It is appropriate, before proceeding, to 2 It will be evident that the model below is easily adopted to other types of taxation. However, a property tax is most "realistic" from the point of view of local governments. comment briefly upon the implicit assumptions inherent in the definition of the utility functions, the fi . Admittedly, the introduction of public goods causes something of a problem for the economic theory of consumer behavior.3 It is often the case that there is no "natural" unit with which to measure the quantity of a public good which an individual consumes-e.g., supposedly all individuals consume "general government," but it is difficult to determine how much is assigned to any one individual. The imperfect procedure adopted here simply is to presume that any utility function has as its arguments private goods and the (by assumption only one) expenditure of the local government. While it may be true that voters are concerned only with that portion of governmental expenditures which provide those goods and services which they consider themselves to be consuming, it appears appropriate to abstract from problems related to the manner in which governmental goods and services are distributed (and also produced).
It is presumed that the fi measure, as a function of x, the utility which individual voters assign to their consumptions of governmental goods and services. Presumably, this assumption can be taken to mean that both production efficiencies and distributional patterns are given and known so that they may be thought of as being incorporated into the f~ . Also, it is obvious that the absence of either inflation or a deflation must be assumed in order to avoid complicated alterations in the definition of the ft . as an alternative form of the budget constraint. Consider now the maximization of (2.1) subject to the constraint (3). Using Lagrangian methods, one obtains Consider carefully the meaning of (5.2). If the ith voter-consumer is not a property owner (Pi = 0), then he will view the municipal expenditure as a "free good" and will desire that value of x to be selected which equates his marginal utility of the expenditure to zero.4 On the other hand, if the ith voter-consumer is a property owner (Pi > 0), then he will want that value of x to be selected which equates his marginal utility of the expenditure, weighed by the reciprocal as of his marginal utility of income Xi , to the ratio of the value of his property over the value of all taxable property in the locality. Assume that the public expenditure is not an inferior good for anyone. Then note that this interpretation implies that if two individuals have identical tastes and incomes, but one owns property and the other does not, then, under the usual assumption of diminishing marginal utility, the property owner will desire a smaller local expenditure than will the non-property owner.5 The ratio Pi/I2Pj fills the role usually assigned to prices in the conventional theory of consumer behavior. Furthermore, with a given fi and with Ii held fixed, if the parameter 2Pi is increased in value in such a manner that Pi > 0 is held constant, then, assuming that the public expenditure is not inferior, the ith voter-consumer will desire the value of x to be increased in order to maintain equality in (5.2). 6 On the other hand, if 2Pj is increased without Pi > 0 being held constant, then, even with the assumption that the public expenditure is not inferior, the desired change in the value of x will depend upon whether the ratio P/,IPi increases or decreases.7 4 Although the Pi are assessed values and do not depend upon r, it should be observed that this argument depends upon the presumption that property taxes are not shifted to renters; although the qualitative (or slightly modified) conclusion remains valid as long as the tax is not fully shifted as can easily be seen by putting the additional term representing the marginal tax shift into (5.2). Nevertheless, the following argument explains why it appears appropriate to conduct the analysis on the basis of the strict assumption that the property tax is not shifted. Imagine a supply curve of homogeneous rental properties. In the short run this supply is viewed best as a fixed stock (vertical curve) since additions or deletions are a negligible portion of the whole. In any event, the imposition of a tax should not cause withdrawals from the supply since such an action would not diminish the tax liability; and the supply can be viewed as being fixed. The demand for rental properties does not depend upon the tax. Hence, the property tax will not be shifted in the short run. In addition, the long run is indeed long in terms of tax shifting since sufficient time must be allowed for the tax to prevent what would have otherwise been a non-negligible addition to the stock of rental properties. 5 Obviously, one must assume here that the local expenditure is one which is desired by both individuals and not one which, say, merely enhances the value of the property owner's property. 6 It is apparent that the phenomenon described above is analogous to the "substitution effect" in the traditional theory of consumer behavior. Obviously, there is an associated "income effect" which makes it necessary to qualify the above statement with the assumption that the public expenditure is not inferior. 7 It is apparent that, in certain instances, the assumption that governmental expenditure equals tax revenue can be relaxed without substantially altering the above results. Up to this point it is assumed that each individual feels free to select the value of x. In fact, the value of x is politically determined so that it remains to incorporate the above developments into a larger model. In doing this, define the value of x (denoted .i) which the ith individual would select if free to do so to be the ith voter-consumer's "preferred point." This concept plays an important part in the discussion which follows.
Since different individuals are likely to have different preferred points (for many reasons), and since the political process can select only one value of x for a given period of time, it is to be expected that some individuals in the populace will experience utility "losses" due to the fact that the politically determined governmental expenditure is not identical to the desired expenditure (or preferred point). In order to formalize this notion of losses due to deviations from the optimum, define qik to be the quantity of the kth good chosen by the ith voter-consumer when x = ti is also selected. In other words, the ik , (k = 1, --, s), and tj are the quantities which constitute the optimal solution to (2). Next, note that if x is regarded as a variable whose value cannot be selected by the ith consumer, then for any given value of x (and under assumption (1) this means that a value of r is also specified), problem (2) can be solved for optimal values of the qia . Let qik', (k = 1, ... , s), represent these optimal values for any given values of x. Note that with Pi , Ii , and the pk being didates are denoted Star (*) and Prime (') respectively. The winning politician is presumed to be the candidate receiving a simple majority of the votes. Before the election day, each candidate is assumed to announce his platform, which consists solely of the value of x which he intends to select if elected. All registered voter-consumers are assumed to know the platform of each of the candidates, and all registered voters cast a ballot on election day. Further, in order to rule out ambiguity it is assumed not only that the winning politician has the power to select, but also that he in fact does select, the value of x specified in his platform. Let x* represent the platform of the candidate Star, and let x' represent Prime's platform. Each voter-consumer chooses between these two candidates on the basis of these platforms, and the basic motivational assumption is that the voter-consumers desire to maximize their individual utilities or, equivalently, minimize their utility losses as these are given by (6) It is obvious that if the candidate Star selects a non-median platform x* < t., then this argument can be reversed. QED. Given the voting rules, Theorem 1 means that if one candidate selects the median of the desired expenditures (preferred points) to be his platform, and the other candidate selects some non-median strategy, then that candidate selecting the median is certain to win the election. Of course, if both candidates choose a median strategy, then a tie is expected since the election is equivalent to a toss of a coin. However, the dominance of the median should be a powerful inducement for politicians to select such a platform, for the choice of a non-median strategy only invites defeat. Further, if the election is viewed as a two-person zero-sum game, then the choice of the median preferred point is the strategy prescribed by the famous minimax theorem.1' It may be true, of course, that politicians do not select their strategies according to the minimax theorem. Nor do the authors argue that minimax is "rational behavior." 11 9 This assumption is not as farfetched as it might seem if it is assumed that the values of the parameters remain fixed during the period in which the winning politician is in office. For an interesting argument concerning the "validity" of this assumption, see Downs [7] , pp. 103-109. 10 For a statement of the minimax theorem and a discussion of two-person zero-sum games, see chapter 4 of Luce and Raiffa [9] .
11 For an interesting discussion of this point, see Luce and Raiffa [9] , pp. 62-63.
It seems obvious that the choice of an electoral strategy depends, at least in part, upon the evaluation of the actual or expected strategy of the opposing candidate. Thus, if the opposition happens, for some reason, to take an extreme position; a candidate might desire to take advantage of the situation and select a certain non-median strategy in order to roll up an impressive majority which might enhance his chances of moving to a higher elective office in the system at some later date.12 However, it may be suggested that since non-median strategies invite defeat if the opposition is shrewd, those candidates who can win in election after election are likely to be the ones who make their choices, at least approximately, by the minimax theorem.'3 Thus it is argued that there should be a "tendency" for winning politicians to be the ones who attempt to find and select the median of the frequency of preferred points.
IV. ON THE EXPLANATORY POWER OF A SIMPLE CASE
There are several reasons why the theory developed in the previous section is not in a form particularly suitable for empirical testing. Probably the most important of these reasons is that Theorem 1 refers to a median m of the frequency of preferred points. This median (and, indeed, the entire frequency) is non-observable. While one can imagine politicians attempting to estimate (explicitly or implicitly) a median, the independent estimation (by the authors) of medians of the preferred points of registered voters in various localities appears to be a prohibitively expensive method of testing this theory. Yet, even a crude attempt toward empirical justification seems important.
The empirical strategy used involves much stronger assumptions than those required for the development of the theory. The additional assumptions which are to be made here are admittedly unrealistic. However, at, least from one point of view, models with descriptively unrealistic assumptions often provide valuable insight into the complexities of the real world and help to determine the relative importance of various theoretical presumptions. Accordingly, some evidence is examined in an effort to determine whether this model, with the addition of some unrealistic assumptions, has any explanatory power.
The particular evidence which is examined refers to the county governments of Pennsylvania. Each county is governed by three County Commissioners who are charged with the responsibility of determining expenditures and taxes. The commissioners are selected under a system where each registered citizen has two votes and the three candidates with the highest number of votes are the winners. Since in practice each party nominates two candidates who tend to adopt approximately the same platform, and any two commissioners form a majority, it is presumed that the majority commissioners are equivalent to a winning candidate so that this aspect of the model roughly approximates reality. Furthermore, Pennsylvania's Act 481-the so-called "Tax Anything Law" -has never been extended to the counties so that for practical purposes these governments are dependent upon the property tax. Hence, it is presumed that this model applies to these data.14 12 Professor Julius Margolis points out that the objectives of local politicians might be to tie up various factions of the electorate and "win big" in order to move up the political ladder to, say, the state level. Margolis argues further that minimax strategies might lead to incumbency but not to advancement. 13 It should be pointed out that, if the opposition is not shrewd, minimax strategies can still lead to "winning big." Also, merely winning is almost a necessary condition in many systems for political advancement so that defeats are to be avoided at all cost. The previous theorem of this paper indicates that the minimax strategy of selecting the median is the best way of avoiding defeats. Hence, even ambitious politicians may find it rational to select the median strategy.
14 Two of Pennsylvania's counties-Forest, for which complete data are not available, and Philadelphia, which has a joint city-county government -are omitted from the data. Table I and Table II were made on the basis of the adjusted figures for Bucks County. 18 An examination of the residuals indicates that one county, Allegheny, contributes a rather large portion of the unexplained variance. Since this County, whose boundaries include the City of Pittsburgh, has a government with a more "metropolitan flavor" than those of the other counties, this fact may be somewhat understandable. General government was selected as a category because the State defines the higher elective offices and the salaries to be paid to these office holders, but allows local authority to determine (i) whether certain appointive jobs are to exist, (ii) the salaries of these jobholders, and (iii) whether certain minor elective offices can be combined or have to be held by different individuals. This category is an example of an instance in which the local electorate has some but not full authority. Highways is an interesting category because much of the funds are obtained, not by taxes levied by the commissioners, but by the State's "returning" to the counties ear-marked monies obtained from the gasoline tax. In this instance, local authority is subjected to State influence in an indirect manner. The judicial category is especially interesting for this purpose because, although the State defines certain clerical offices, a great deal of leeway is left to local authority in organizing the local judicial system. Similarly, other expenditures-which includes corrections, charities, hospitals and health, libraries, civil defense, airports, and miscellaneous expenditures-is a category where local authority is more dominant. Thus in examining these categories of expenditures one should be able to ascertain, at least in a rough manner, the effects of certain institutional phenomena which were not included in this theory.
Ignoring these institutional phenomena for a moment, note that if the assumptions of the multiple expenditure case are satisfied simultaneously for the counties in Pennsylvania, if the additional and unrealistic assumptions of identical tastes and equal incomes are admitted, if it is assumed that no category of expenditure is an "inferior good," and if the theory is stated in terms of per capita expenditures (which, as was noted earlier, causes no difficulty), then the difference between the counties in the per capita expenditures in each category should be explained by the differences in the median ratios Pm/,IPj of each county. Further, for each category there should be an inverse relationship between the per capita expenditure and the median ratio. Since these ratios cannot be observed, the procedure used in the previous instance, including the two propositions, is adopted here. Accordingly, consider the following multiple regression (where n represents the population of any given county) Consider the effects of the institutional phenomena. It seems clear on an a priori basis that if these phenomena have an effect, then they should distort the predicted relationships. Thus one expects to obtain somewhat better fits for judicial and other expenditures than for general government and highways.
The empirical results are summarized in Tables II, III of the fits are exceptional, it is interesting to note that, as measured by the multiple correlation coefficients, the best fit is obtained for judicial expenditures and the poorest for highways. On the other hand, the fit for general government is almost as good as that for judicial expenditures, so that the antici-pated influences of the institutional phenomena are not fully confirmed in these empirical results. However, these data do suggest that the model has explanatory power. The results do not contradict the predictions of the theory. Granted the unrealistic nature of some of the assumptions and the crudeness of the two propositions, these would seem to be encouraging empirical results.
VII. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Several interrelated questions merit further attention. First, in a sense this politicaleconomic model of local expenditures represents little more than an effort to relate the preferences of the voters to the decisions on expenditures of democratically selected politicians. As such it may have merit in and of itself; for the formal model stands quite apart from the strict assumptions which were necessary to relate it to the empirical results. In this regard, it is important to point out the conceptual (if not so practicable) possibility of subjecting this theory to an adequate empirical test. One can imagine determining the frequency of preferred points of the registered voters in a locality by survey methods and then relating actual decisions on expenditures to this frequency. Yet, the crude procedure used in this paper also has merit. Granted the appropriateness of the two propositions, by augmenting the model with the additional and unrealistic assumptions in order to relate the theory to the empirical results, one gains insight into the problem of the relative importance of various assumptions. The fact that the results of the regressions do not contradict the theory suggests that the augmented theory has explanatory power and that property holdings are important determinants of expenditure decisions. The fact that the fits are not exceptional tends to indicate that other factors also are important. As a rough attempt to determine what these factors might be, other variables such as median income, median education, etc., were added as independent variables in the regressions; but no significant improvement was made in the proportion of variance explained. At least to the authors, this particular result tends to suggest that differences in preferences for expenditures on the part of the voters may be an important explanatory factor. 21 It also is important to point out that even within the context of this model several theoretical questions remained unanswered. For example, Theorem 2 depends both upon the presumption that the functions h (the taste for public expenditures) are the same for all voters in a locality and upon the assumption that utility functions are "separable" between private goods and public expenditures so that (12) obtains. Additional work aimed at relaxing both of these assumptions appears important.
Finally, although it is appropriate to base a theory of local governmental expenditure upon the assumption of a property tax, it should be noted that one might just as easily presume that the source of governmental revenues is an income tax and that under such conditions results quite similar to those derived herein follow naturally. However, the authors do not feel that such a step would make this model completely applicable to the allocation of Federal expenditures since the phenomenon of Congressional appropriation, where there are many electorates to be considered instead of one, would be omitted.22 The model described herein appears more appropriate for situations in which the political process is relatively simple. X2'E = 0 so that the vector X2 is orthogonal to the vector E. Note from the first of the constraints (17) that the vector Ah and the vector E differ only by the scalar X (6) so that Ah and E have the same direction. Therefore,
